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[REDACTED]-21752-04
8 April 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Effort Against Cambodia
REFERENCE: DOD Memorandum for Special Group (Attached)

1. This memorandum contains recommendations in paragraph 6 on this subject which will be discussed at the Special Group meeting on 9 April 1964.
2. The Special Group has limited U-2 overflights of Cambodia to a 30-mile wide zone along the western border of South Vietnam. Under the present ground rules, SAC is undertaking to satisfy this requirement and CIA can be called upon for assistance if required.
3. Apart from the continuation of the presently authorized repetitive coverage of targets within the 30-mile wide zone, DIA is now acknowledging a requirement for coverage of seven COMUSMACV-approved targets outside this zone and which are essentially associated with transportation routes.
4. Though not mentioned in reference, recent conversations with DIA representatives indicate that DIA is also interested in obtaining at least baseline coverage of all that area of Cambodia east of 104°. This latter requirement may or may not be surfaced in the Special Group discussion of reference. CIA believes that one-time coverage of all of Cambodia east of 104° would be useful for studies of the logistic supply net. We do not believe that repetitive coverage of this territory is necessary for transportation analysis at this time since the main VC supply routes are currently along roads in Laos and within the Cambodian 30-mile border zone which are being covered as frequently as weather permits. If this situation were to change, we might well need repetitive coverage of a broader area in Cambodia at that time.
5. As indicated in reference, there is now an increased risk of detection of U-2 overflights of Cambodia due to the operations of a Soviet SIG BAR radar at Pochentong Airfield near Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The SIG BAR is operated sporadically by Cambodians who are being trained in its use by Soviet technicians.

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6. Recommendations

a. That you approve one-time coverage of the seven COMCON-approved targets mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

b. That, if proposed, you approve one-time baseline coverage of the remaining area east 104°.

c. That you disapprove any repetitive coverage of this area at this time.

d. That you approve continued coverage by SAC of the 30-mile border zone.

e. That, if recommendations a. and b. above are approved, responsibility for these missions be assigned to CIA since this would be consistent with current ground rules for overflights in Indochina.

LS/

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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